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LEGITIMACY, SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIME CHANGE 
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE FUI COUPS AND THE 
BOUGAINVILLE REBELLION 
Peter Lannour 
The coups in Fiji during 1987 were the first fmcible changes d govamne.nt amoog 
the independent states d the South Pacific. The Boogainville rebellim which began 
in lare 1988 became the most violeot inremal cooflict in the regim. Both events 
lxougbt the military to the fcngrouod d dm>estic politics, and challenged pevi<m 
assumpti<n about the legitimacy and sovaeignty d govemmmts. If 'regime' refm 
to a lxoad set d expectali<n and asmmpti<n about govemmeot. then both sets d 
events amount to regime changes. 'Ibis paper compares the two events, using idea 
about sovereignty and legitimacy. It examines the ideas generally, and in relatim to 
South Pacific politics, and then it summarizes the similarities and diffemx:es. and 
draws some cooclusims about regime change. 
In nom1ll times it may be bard to distingWsh feelings about the legitimacy d a 
govemmem from IOUliDe acquiescmce. The mtinary activities d gCMl1llDml can 
rmtinue without anyone comidering wbdber tbse is a single, abaolure, source d 
audimity behind them. Rebelli<D and COllpS tf llal, however, bring legitimacy and 
sovereignty into sharp focus. Rebels accuse the govemmem d ruling illegitimately, 
and invch tla own claims to legitunacy. Coop leaders strike at the sources d 
sovereignty. and seek to displace. replace er enlist them. 
Both cooceptS-legitimacy and sovereignty~ve normative and analytic 
dimensioos. But in both cases we can describe and analyse claims to legitimacy or 
sovereignty without necessuily accepting or endorsing them ourselves. We also 
need to miderstand the normative dimensioos. as these propelled actors such as 
Rabuka and Ona, who invoked notions dlegitimacy and sovereignty to justify their 
actions to themselves. their supporters and their critics. 
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Sovereignty 
SoYereignty refezs to the idea that lheJe is a 'final audKXity within a givm tariuxy' 
(Krasner 1988:86, cl Hinsley 1986:1). It bas two dimemioos: a sideways claim 
against other sources ci power and a downwards claim on people or resources. 'The 
penoo aver whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-
bolders' (Stinchcombe, qmced in Tilly 1985:171) 
As a claim. it may be cballeoged, or unenforceable. Its scope may be limited in 
at least two ways: it may be limited to particular issues, such as the regulation of 
economic exploitation (but not shipping in exclusive economic 7.0DeS); it may be 
limited by concepts of public and pivate that may put some activities, such as 
abortion. beyond the scope of st.ate action (Krasner 1988:87). The public/private 
distinction. and the example ci abortion. raise questions ci gender and sovereignty 
which will be returned to below. 
Though largely abandoned to lawyers, the idea of sovereignty seems relevant 
to understanding South Pacific politics in several ways. 
First, it has become part ci the language of claims by indigenous people, as in 
the debate about rangatiratanga in New 7.ealand (McHugh 1989). In several coun-
tries indigenous people are going back to original treaties and charters as bases for 
claims of political and economic sovereignty: Maoris to the Treaty of Waitangi in 
1840; indigenous Fijians to the Deed of Cession in 1874; and, on a smaller scale, the 
traditional landowners of Port Moresby to Omm>odore Erskine's 1884 declaration 
of British Protectorate over southern New Guinea which promised 'no acquisition 
of land' would be recognized by the queen (Tmks et al. 1973:39). 
Secoodly. while most Pacific Island constituti~ declare the state to be 
sovereign. many limit the powers of parliament to legislate in relation to customary 
land. and others recogniu or aeate alternatives toparliamemary sovereignty in the 
form of councils of chiefs. Themostradicalformci extra~tibllional sovereignty 
is probably in the role that Fiji's 1990 republican constitution gives to the Great 
Council of Chiefs. The constitution 'recognizes• (rather than establishes) the Bose 
Levu Vakaturanga (Section 3) and gives it the power to appoint and remove the 
president (Cllapter 5). The Great Council of Ollefs also reoommends on the 
appointment of Fijian senators (Section 55[1 ]a) and is exempt from review by the 
ombndsn>an (Section 135 [2]5)(Nationa1Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party 
Coalition 1991:36-38). Even if coostitutionally umecognized. custom often pro-
vides a powerful resttaint on state action. 
Thirdly, a number of states. particularly in Melanesia and Miaonesia, have 
adopted federal or quasi-federal constitutions that divide sovereignty between 
levels of government. 
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Fourthly, difficulties of implementation limit the effective sovereignty of most 
states in the region. These difliculties range from problems of transport and 
C()l11munication among islands, to shortages of skilled staff, and local structures of 
power that resist even the most determined centtal initiatives. A well documented 
example is thePlantatim Acquisitim Scheme in Papua New Guinea (Walttl' 1981). 
Flftbly, a munber of territories ttmain colonies, and the formal international 
legal sovereignty of five states is formally ccmpromised by relationships of 'free 
association' with New Zealand (Niue, Cook Islands) and the USA (Marshall 
Islands, the Fed«ated States of Miaonesia and Palau). 
Sixthly, it is a cxwnmonplace in the study of the international relations of the 
South Pacific that the formally sovereign states are not 'really independent'. Much 
of the literature refers to problems of scale, but many of what Held calls the 'gaps' 
between de jure and de facto sovereignty, or between sovereignty and autonomy, 
are different ooly in degree to those affecting much larger states in the modern 
intemational system. Following Held (1989:228-237) these gaps are caused by 
• an increasingly transnational and interdependent world economy that limits 
the scope of any particular government's ecooomic policy; 
• the existence of hegemonic powers, and power blocs, particularly the USA 
(and in the South Pacific, perhaps Australia and New 7.ealand); 
• the existence of international organizations, which restrain member govern-
ments (for example, the lntematiooal Moneta?y Fund), or non-government 
organizations that irritate them (fer example, Amnesty Jntemational, Com-
munity Aid Abroad); 
• the growth of international law (for example, in relation to war aimes or 
human rights); 
• the domestic spillover of coocans with naliooal security (for example, in the 
internal activities d intelligence agencies); 
• extemalities, such as the environmental impact of one country's activities on 
another (rising sea levels from global warming might be the most extreme 
South PacifJC example). 
However limited in practice, the idea of sovereignty clearly suits the pmposes 
of South Pacific governments, justifying and supporting each other in their claims 
todomesticrule,andexcludingothercJaimants.Itistheworkingdoctrineofforeign 
affairs departments, whose task it is to manage the boundaries within which claims 
of final authority are made, and whose working relationships nm sideways to the 
officials of other sovereign states as much as downwards to their own populations. 
1be South Pacific provides a relatively bmign extema1 environment for domestic 
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claims of sovereignty: there are no outstanding tenitoria1 claims, though outlying 
islands arebardtopattol, and there is a persistent suspicion of the hegemonic claims, 
and military capacities, of Australia. New Zealand, France and the US. Papua New 
Guinea also has problems managing its border with Indonesia. 
While the idea of sovereignty makes sense for relations between swes, it has 
less purchase on indigenous political traditions, or the actual practices of power in 
these societies. Only a few eastern Pacific societies have traditions of stratified, 
centralized, geographically extensive monarchies (Tahiti, Mangareva, Tonga, 
Rarotonga, Hawaii; see Goldman 1970). FJsewbere, political systems were more 
diffuse, unspecializ.ed and smaller in scale. Their boundaries were vague, and 
several claims to final authority might coexist within them. 
Michel Foucault's famous phrase 'Right in the West is the King's right' 
(1986:230) suggests that 'sovereignty' may be a particularly Eurocentric notion. 
According to Foucault, it played four roles: to describe a mechanism of power in 
feudal society, where sovereignty was parcelled out among the nobility; 'as a 
justificationforthecoosttuctioooflarge--scaleadminisuativemonarcbies' (ibid.:238); 
as an ideology used by one side or the other in the seventeenth century wars of 
religion; andfmally in the consttuction of parliamentary altematives to the absolut-
ist monarchies (ibid.; see also Held 1989:216-225). . 
Meanwhile, however, Foucault suggested that a new form of non-sovereign 
power has been emerging: more continuous, dispersed.finely grained, and based on 
surveillance. Foucault called this 'disciplinary' power, and localed it in the practices 
of institutioos like prisons, hospitals and schools, and in the 'normalizing' activities 
of professionals such as doctors, teachen and social workers. The two f<X'IDS d. 
power are iDccmmeosurat.e but coexist. The old theory of sovereignty has been 
democratized into a notion of collective sovereignty, exercised through parliamen-
tary institutions, but it is sustained by the new mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. 
Foucault's arguments about sovezeign and non-sovereign power have several 
resonances in the non-West.em context of the South Pacific. 
The kingly idea of sovereignty appears in theconstitutionsand domestic politics 
of South Pacific states in twoforms-theearlier feudal form in Tonga since the la!e 
ninetee.uthcentury, and Fiji since 1990-and the final parliamentary form in others. 
Democratized or not, power is cooceptuali7.ed in the same way as a top-down 
relationship between soveieign and subject/citizen. 
Quite separately, there have emerged numerous examples of the 'normalizing' 
institutions that developed in parallel with central governments. Colonial planta-
tions, high schools, hospitals, prisons, seminaries and universities are in many ways 
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sttildngly similar institutions, in architecture, location, methods of recruitment, and 
internal rules. They were involved in disciplining and ttansforming their imnates. 
Sovereign and disciplinary power came together at ~ when the 
products of these 'normalizing' institutions typically became the first generation of 
national leaders to hold state office. The products of such institutions continue to 
play a more salient role in South Pacific politics than elsewhere, whether it is the 
Papua New Guinea university studmts who violeotly protested against parliamen-
tary members' pay rises in 1991, or the ethnic Fijian prisoners who escaped from 
Naboro prison just before the secaod coup and 
jogged or were driven amiably up VICtCXia Parade under police and army 
escort to drink tea at Govemmem Hoose w~ the govemor-geoeral (Scm 
1988:127;seealsol..al 1988:115). 
Foucault's argument about the coexistence of old 'sovereign' and new 'dis-
ciplinary' power recogni7.es the salience of these institutions in the political 
landscape in ways that a focus oo central institutions would not. 
Foucault's more general orientation towards the micromechanisms of power 
also seems relevant to the politics of the region before the introduction of sovereign 
states, and oo the dispersed bases of power that continue to coexist with juridical 
sovereignty, and to the relationship between state and family. He argues for 
atteDtioll to power 
at its eittremities, in it.s ultimate destinati~ with those poin1s wbele it 
bec<mes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions 
(1986:232). 
1bis dispersed, embodied notion of power~ther than the top-down picture of 
sovereign-subject/citizen-looks rather similar to Southall 's characterization of 
'stateless society', in which 
the fimdamental responsibility for the mainten8J'K)'l d society ilSdf is much 
more widely dispersed thrwgbout it.s varied institutklm and its whole popula-
tion, at least, usually, all adult males (1968:167). 
Soutball's Jefereoce to adult males, and our earlier Jeference to abortion as 
marking a (potential) limit to sovereignty, raise questions of gender. The relation-
ship benveenstatepower and the power held bymenoverwomenhas been explored, 
for example, by Pateman (1988). It is an issue in South Pacific politics in several 
contexts, including domestic violence (where masculine sovereignty within the 
family is under challenge from state agencies, particularly in Papua New Guinea), 
and in the recent ending of Jbe monopoly of voting righls by beads of family (mauu) 
in Western Samoa. 
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Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a mcxe supple and inclu.We idea than sovereignty, and refers to the 
'conditiom wmch justify government and reqme obedience' (Barker 1990:4). 
Buker distinguishes three distinct awroacbes to it 
• normative, concerned with why we should obey particular regimes; 
• legal, concemed with the location of sovereignty; and 
• social scientific, coocemed with how and why claims to govern legitimately 
are accepted or rejected. 
South Pacific examples of the normative approach might include debates about 
Indonesia's right to rule in Irian Jaya, Port Moresby's right to rule Bougainville, or 
the army's right to intervene in politics in Fiji. These debates quickly become 
concrete when we coosider the cooditions in which we think people should obey 
(and our attitudes towards people who decide, often bravely, not to obey). 
Examples of the legal approach might include the deliberations of the Vanuatu 
courts over the president's attempt to dissolve parliament in 1988, or the legal 
arguments about the role of the governor general in the aftennath of the first coup 
in Fiji (Ghai and Courell 1990). These concerned, in part, the question of wbete 
'final authority' in the political system should lie: with the prime minister; with 
parliament; with the governor genenl/president; aJJ/J/or with the judges and the 
courts themselves. 
Examples of the social scientif'JC approach might include debates about the 
relative role of class and ethnicity in explaining recent politics in Fiji. WrittlS like 
Robertson and Tamanisau (1988) tend to class and economic explanations for 
obedience and dissent, while writtlS like Scarr (1988) tend to ethnic and historical 
explanations. 
As the examples show, the normative, legal and social scientific approaches 
may be hard to disentangle in practice. Each approach may also present the same 
situatim in quite different lights: wemay(normatively)rejectobedience to a regime 
which is (legally) sovereign while (social scientifically) recognizing that others 
meanwhile give it support. Barker remarks: 
We all like to think that eft'ective popular fury and ethical diaatisfactim 
coincide both with each odw and our own peferences and values (1990:42). 
The classic sociaHcientific distinctim between types of legitimacy was that 
Max Weber drew between traditimal, legal, and charismatic. Barker suggests that 
a fourth. 'value rational', might be derived from otheJ' pans of Weber's writing 
(1990:49). h refers to the substantive policies and values of the regime, and their 
consistency with those of the people obeying it Democracy as such does not appear 
in Weber's typology, perhaps because it wolb through each type (and a democratic 
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regime would, aJmost by definition. conform to the additional 'value rational• form; 
ibid.:53-54). The absence of. reference to democracy is particularly important in 
relation to analysis of. the Fijian case. where the Bavadra govemment•s claim to 
legitimacy rested on the results of a general election. On Bougainville. by contrast. 
the rebellion took place in spite of one of its parliamentary representatives. Fr John 
Momis. being a ministel" in the natiooal govemment. 
South Pacific politics presents numerous examples ofWeberian typeS of claims 
to obedimce. and acceptmce or rejection of them. Sahlins•s famous (1962-63) 
distinction between 'big man• and 'chief' is partly a matter of charisma versus 
tradition. Meleisea •s Malcing of Modon Samoa very explicitly adopts a Weberian 
framework. Weber was c:oncerned to explain the process of transformation of. the 
legitimacy of traditional authority to the new notions of legitimacy underlying the 
ratiooal legal authority of modem Western European institutions. These insights 
have been useful in analysing the historical proces.ses of. change in Western Samoa 
since the 1860s and thecooflicts and contradictions when the two typeS of authority 
and their respective sources of legitimacy attempt to coexist (Meleisea 1987:229). 
In practice. politicians usually mix their appeals. as in the famous distn"bution 
of 4.000 cartons of bee&' by lambakey Okuk on the Kundiawa airstrip during Papua 
New Quinea•s 1982 general election campaign (Dorney 1990: 21-23). For nine 
hours Okuk played on his own charisma. legality (as ministel" of. Transport) and 
tradition (bis headdress of. cassowary feathers; the detailed group-by-groop distri-
bution of wealth). The most explicit rejection of claims (rather than simple 
indifference to them) is perhaps in the LabourJNFP•s critique of tradidonalwm in 
Fiji. 
Several aspects of Barter•s 1990 analysis of.political legitimacy seem relevant 
to South Pacific politics. 
F°ll'St.legitimacyisnotasingleuodiffermtiatedattribute,butmayvaryacca'ding 
to type. to the parties to the relationship with the state. and to aspects of their 
relationship. In particular. the legitimacy of the relationship between state and 
citiun may be much less important than relationships within the elite. and with 
those whose support they depend on (particularly the army or police). In relatioo to 
ordinary powerless citiz.ens. the state may simply get by with acquiescence rather 
than legitimacy (Barker 1990:1<17-125). Thus a South Pacific state will have a quite 
different. and more significant. legitimacy relationship with its army and police 
0001manders than with its law-abiding citizens or its street aiminals. 
Secoodly. in maintaining its legitimacy. the state may be its own worst enemy. 
Barker argues that popular dissent is typically reactive to an expansion of. state 
power into new areas. or to a changing of.the rules. He cites De Toqueville as saying 
'governments are most insecure when they promote change• (ibid.:188). 'Getting 
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tough', Barker suggests, 'ooly works if people see themselves as out of line' 
(ibid.: 169). In South Pacific terms. a state committed to development, or extending 
or withdrawing the scope of its activities, becomes therefore more likely to subvert 
its own legitimacy. However, conservative regimes have their own distinctive 
weaknesses. Barker suggests they may be particularly clumsy in dealing with 
dissent. By assuming a 'shared moral parish• they treat dissent as wilful or wicked, 
and recogniz.ed as such by its the perpetrattn (ibid.:133). They cannot see thatpeople 
may genuinely disagree with them. 
'lbirdly. Barker argues that in cultivating their own legitimacy. states typically 
appeal to sources of authority outside the state but which the state uniquely 
expresses. Examples are race, class, the revolution. and so on. The point is not that 
the state simply borrows authority from autonomous competing somces: it makes 
the additional claim of its unique ability to express them (ibid.:138-40). 1bus Soudl 
Pacific states do not simply draw on the autonomous authority of 'tradition' or 
'indigenousness'. Theyaremakingamorec::omplexandambitiousclaimtoaunique 
ability to express these values (for example. 'ooly through the state can traditioo be 
maintained'. or 'ooly through the state can indigenousness be promoted'). 
Finally, Randall Collins's (1986) account of Weberian sociological theory 
responds to the problem that Weber's typeS are. aft« all, just typea: they do not 
explain bow and why claims to legitimacy are made and rejected or ~.just 
the forms they take. Collins locates the explanation in Weber's discussion of 
interstate competition. He concludes: 
•. nationalism for Weber is the eae.oce ci political legitimacy. Legitimacy, as 
usually defined, is the willingness of followas to accept cxders given to lbem 
as pq>erly to be obeyed. Too often this is cooceived ci as a kind of psycho-
logical quantity impressed on individuals by soci•Hsation, and acling as an 
intaDa1 gyroscope bringing abwtpolidcal obediau. Yet Weber's discussioo 
shows that legitimacy is nodling if not dynamic. It is not an inrrmalized 
constant but an emoOooal fetling that arises from meuing the pestige ci the 
state at any given maneot (Cdlins 1986:155). 
Two aspects of Collins 's argumau seem relevant to the South Pacific. One, that 
states are likely tobavediff"ICUlty in claiming legitimacy where decolonization takes 
place without a nationalist struggle (most cases). and where interstate conflict is 
absent (throughout the region). 1be other, that legitimacy is intermittent. and 
dependent on the performance of states; it cannot be assumed as a steady back-
ground to ordinary political life. 
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Fiji 
Sovereignty 
Between the first and secood coops there was an inleose debate about, in pan. where 
dcmestic SOYereigoty lay. h IUmed on the role d the governor genenI (Gbai and 
Ccarell 1990). Having mested the c~ Rabdca turned jmmediate!y to the IJJYCf-
nm general. who received die unsought advice d the chief justice and other judges 
that the purported suspemion of the coostibltion by Rabuka was 'illegal and invalid•. 
He declared a stare of anergeocy. clainring to have assmnect executiw power in the 
absence of the cabinet. and sv.ue in Rabuka as bead of govemmeot. But the IOYmlCI' 
gmeral blcbd away from swearing in a new council of ministers Rabuka bad cbosell 
(and including the fcxmez p:ime minista'. Rani Mara). Instead, be dissdved parlia-
ment and appointed his own council of advisers to review the 1970 ccmtitution. He 
also called a met-ring d die Great Council d Oliefs. which endorsed die coup. 1be 
deposed Coalitioo applied to die Supreme C.ourt to declare that the IOYmlCI' geoera1•s 
dissolution d parliament and dismiaal of the gowmmeot bad been illegal. 1be 
review oommiuee reported. but UDder 1D01mring Fijian natimaUst peaure the Alli-
ance and Coalitioo party leaden came togetbm' in a power-sharing agreemeat that 
was abcxted by die secood coup on 2S September (Lal 1988; Scur 1988; Rd>eltsoo 
and Tamanisau 1988). 
The constitutional case bad hem due to be heard on 29 Septt:mber, and the 
question of wbetba sovereignty in the sense of 'final power• lay with the prime 
minister. the governor general, parliament or the courts themselves was unresolved. 
Instead Rabuka proposed an alternative, extta-coostitutional farm of sovereignty 
that reached back behind independence to cession: 
Fiji was ceded to Oleat Britain by die Tui Viti, die Vunivalu dBau, and other 
chiefs d Fiji, and at indrpllftdence the sovereignty d the coumry was never 
returned to the Fijian chiefs. Now, they want it back (quoted in Scarr 
1988:132-133). 
'Ibis extta-coostitutiooal view of domestic sovereignty is partly reflected in the 
powers given to the Great Council of Oliefs in the 1990 c:oostitution. At the same 
time the constitution seems also to recognb:e the de facto sovereignty of the army 
as a final arbit« of Fiji politics, giving it 'overall responsibility ••• to ensure at all 
times the security. defence and well being ofFtji and its peoples• (Sectioo 94[3]). 
Issues of intanational. rather than domestic, sovereignty arose, fint in the 
deposedprimeminister'sappealtoAustraliaforassistance.andsec:cndlyintherole 
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played by the meeting of the South Pacific Forum. which refused to bear ministers 
sent by the deposed government. rejected proposals for a delegation to Fiji. and 
urged other countries to respect Fijian sovereignty (Lal 1988:108-111). 
Legitimacy 
As well as the legal issues discussed above. the Fiji coups raised distinct questions d 
normative and social scie.olific legitimacy. 1benmmalivequestiom wae dthe kind: 
should we obey the CoaUtion government or the military regime; what support should 
we give to pecple who decide bravely. even illegally. to raist eitb«. 1be social 
scientific questions wae of the kind: what smt d appeaJs wae being made by the 
Coalition. the coup leaders. or the governor gmeral. and why and to what extent wae 
they succesdUl. 
With its plays oo tradition. charisma and legality. Fiji politics since the coups 
lends itself easily to Weberian caregories. It also confmns Barter•s emphasis on the 
differential cbaract« of legitimacy. and the importance of the legiDmacy relatioo-
ship between the stare and powerful supporters. as much as the populatioo at large. 
With the exception of some demoosttatioos. strikes and boycotts, politics since the 
first coup has been largely an elite affair. Fiji alsocoofmns Barker's argmnent that 
the legitimacy of states is most vulnetable when they promote change: it was a 
conservative backlash against the Coalition victory that provided the occasioo and 
opportunity for military intetventioo. 
Barker's argument about stare claims to be the 'unique expression' d sources 
of authority outside well explains the ambivalent relationship between 'Fijianness' 
and thestate. InooesenseFijiancommunal traditicms predate the iDttoductionof the 
state, and still stand outside it Yet in another sense, they are tightly interwoven--
through the structures of Fijian actministtation-ed bard to imagine without it In 
that sense criticism of the 'invem.ed • characta of Fijian tradition,« the mixed and 
'noo-traditiooal' ccmposition of the Great Council of Clliefs misses the point 
Fijians have become a a kind of sta111SWJ/Jc: as an ethnic group, rather than a collec-
tion of individuals, their future has become bound up with the state in ways that the 
future of other ethnic groups has not 
Boupinville 
Sovereignty 
1be questions d sovereignty raised by the Bougainville rebellioo are quite different 
from those in Fiji afta' the coups. In put they tum on the point « poinls at which 
'crime• turned into 'rebellioo' (the subject d a Mel>ourne court case between BCL 
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and its ioslRrs. whose exclusim clause emured they did not have to pay up if and 
when the nuatioo beaime a 1*Dico). A criminal. in this sense, recognius sover-
eignty ('it's a fair cop'), whereas the rebel challenges it. 
Hobsbawm 's notion of 'social banditry' eaptmes the ambiguity of the distinc-
tion between crime and politics. According to Francis Kabui, dJe premier of the 
North Solomom provincial govemmeot: 'the people see Ona as some kind of a folk 
hero' (quoted in T/14 Times of PNG 2-8 February 1989, p.7). 1be Bougainville 
rebels played to variations of Hobsbawm's (1969) three typeS of social bandiL Fust 
there was dJe 'noble robber', like Robin Hood (who. however, bad not planned that 
Sherwood Fcnst should secede). Secood was the 'terror-bringing avenger', ad-
mired, as Filer (1992) suggests of Ona, for his rage, and whose modem exemplar 
might be Rambo (whose name was frequendy invoked on Bougainville). 1be third 
typ&--dlough without suggesting any stage& of development-was the 'primitive 
iesistancefigbterorguerillaunit',ofthekindthatfougbtofftbePapuaNewGuinea 
army. 
Limited collective chaJtmges to state sovereignty seem to be a regular feature 
of Papua New Guinea politics. Saffu argues: 
Popular puticipatian from the grass roots tmds to be episodic. dnct. and 
dramatic l'llber than cmrirnJous, roudne and mediated through parties er OCbel' 
wlUDllly groups wbich have mou8h caofidenc:e in their infh-ence and ability 
to obtain results without rescxtiog to demomttalims, roadblocks. disruption d 
services, and threats to popetty. Demands are usually fer canpmsatioo and 
for redrea of peiceived injustices and other specific grievances. There is a 
great deal of such limited "popular uprisings" in PNG politics ..• But the 
appemance d radicalism is usually belied by the narrowness and specificity d 
demmm .••• There is no wish to JDOYe beyood the specific to questico the 
gmera1. the framewcdt dial may be respoosiblo-« at any rife that may be 
povkliDg the oppmlUDity-fer the specific grievance. 1be appearance d 
radicalism is also belied by the evideot relucllDCe d dJe leaders to engage in 
any sustained mobilisatiooal dl'CX1S, ooce the specific demand has been met 
(1982:265). 
The Bougainville rebellion. of coune, wmt beyood this typical pattan. First, 
the 'lbreals to property' were systematically and repeatedly carried out. Secondly, 
Ona at least moved from the particular to the general, questiooing the framework 
lapODSiblefor the grievance (Bougainville's inclusim within Papua New Guinea; 
Bougainvil1e Copper Limited's influence on the government; the South African 
attitudes of management; the 'white mafia' advising the natiooal government). 
Ona 's emerging general analysis wu 'e.&lmonational ':the root cause of the problem 
on Bougainville was the alien domination of the natiooal government, and Papua 
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New Guinea domination ofBougainville. 'Ibirdly. the army was called in. no longer 
simply to assist the police. but acting aggressively in adistinctivelymilitarymanner. 
against rebels in the bush. Fourthly. while some of the landowners were ready to 
bargain aboutcooipeosation paymems and development projects. Ona continued to 
bold out for wider political goals. In an interview with a Bougainville journalist in 
earlySeptemberl989.0na•s•rightbandman .. SamK.auooa.wareportedusaying 
that. '[the] wish is to push for a referaldum [on secession]. iDdepeodence and 
secession for Bougainville • (Age lS September 1989). 
Once the army bad withdrawn, this secessionist project was expressed in the 
declaration of the 'Republic of Mekamui • on 17 May 1990. Yet the 'sovereignty• 
of. the republic is far from clear: it remains unrecognized by other states. and its 
territorial extent is vague and under pressure from Papua New Guinea government 
forces in Buka. It may still be. as CooDor suggests, that 
'Ftbnonatiooal coocems by their very nature are nae obsessed with a vision ct 
freeckxn from domination by JJCIJl1ltJDben than with a vision ct freedom to 
cooduct foreign relati~ with states (1987:215). 
While the Papua New Guinea government bas little domestic sovereignty 
within Bougainville. its inlemational sovereignty has been largely unchallenged. 
Legitimacy 
Notions of 'sovereignty', and distincti~ between 'aime' and 'rebeDioo' seem too 
crude to make much sense ct what bas been happeoing in Bougainville. Several 
aspects ct Barker's analysis ct legitimacy seem more appropriate. 
First. as cultivator of.legitimacy, the state has proved to be its own worsteoemy. 
through army harassment and atrocities. 
Secondly, the relationship between the particular and the general (from mining 
grievances to rejection of. Papua New Guinea rule) is partly a matter of differential 
legitimacies. Before the rebellion. people mighthavefeltthatoolyparticular c:entral 
government legislati<D was illegitimate. without feeling that all legislation was (an 
issue complicated on Bougainville by the division of. sovereignty between Port 
Moresby and the constitutionally protected provincial govemmmt). Similarly, the 
state needed to maintain its legitin>acy relationships with groups able to sabotage a 
mine nae carefully than it maintained its relationships with groups who did not 
have that leverage. 
'lbirdly, the Papua New Guinea state may have bad less to fear from popular 
uprisings on Bougainville. or demonstration effects on other mines or in other 
provinces, than from disaffection among its own supporten in Port Moresby. 
notably the policewbodemonsttatedoutsideFr Momis 's house in March 1989. 'fed 
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up with political interference and indecisiveness' (quoted in Dorney 1990: 139) and 
the failed BarbeCoop, after the withdrawal d the army. 
Conclusions 
Comparing the evems in terms of. sovereignty yields sew:ral ditfermces. The idea d a 
single locadm of sovereignty wu stroog and persisteot through the coups in Fiji. The 
ooly iSRJe WU where that sovereignty WU localed: in parliamenl; with the goverJKW' 
gmeral; or with lhe Great Council d Chiefs or the army itself ( er in sane uneay 
parallelogram dfcxces joining all dlhem). By coottast (c:kxDesdc) sovereignty never 
semw to have been such an issue in Papua New Guinea, with its indigenous traditi<n 
d •swetessnea', a coostibllim which divided it up between provincial govemmenlS, 
and a political systemcbamct.erized by what Sa1fu (1982) has caUed 'limited "popular 
upisings"'. Imematimally, bowew:r, the Fiji goyemmeot bas bad a harder job 
defending its sovereignty since the coups than the Papua New Guinea govemmmt 
bas bad since the rebellioo. And in bocb cases the tmitorial scope of. Ntional 
goy&:umeut sovereignty bas been questioned. In Fiji, RManan leaden talked d 
independence from Fiji after the coups. In Papua New Guinea Bougainvillean leaders 
quesliooed the colooial bo11ndary with Solc:mcn Islands, while their own tenitorial 
claims wae queslimed by the govemmeot's reoccupatioo d Buka, and by the 
uocatain aUegiaDce d the Bougainvillean equivalem d Rr•nma, ilS own outlying 
islands. 
There were also diffeiences in terms of legitimacy. in Fiji, the breakdown in 
legitimacy was fU'St and foremost unong the elite and between the centtal institu-
tioos enttencbed at indepmdeoce. including the army. In Papua New GWnea, by 
contrast. the elite-Bougainvillean and national-largely stuck together; the 
breakdown took place between them and ordinary Bougainvilleans. Itwas expressed 
at first in sympathy for landowner militancy and later in what amounted to an island-
wide rebellioo. which included attacks on plantatioos and govemmem buildings 
throughout the province. The level of popularparticipatioo in events in Fiji has been 
much lower. Tbele is also a difference in the efforts of the states themselves to 
restore legitimacy: in Fiji there has been continuous manouevring to reconstruct 
some basis of. legitimacy in legality, charisma, tradition and the promise of. 
elections; the Papua New Guinea goyemmeot's attentioo to the legitimacy of its rule 
over Boupinville seems to have been less consistent, and was perhaps fatally 
undamiDed by the actions of. the military. 
Ideas of legitimacy and sovereignty form a buis for systematic comparison of. 
events, but also (through these events) ilhnninate questions about regime change. 
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Both cases demonstrate the fragility of regimes. conceived of as undentandinp and 
expectations about government. rather than particular personnel. In these cases. 
regime change has involved less and more than a forcible replacemmt of penonnel 
from the government of the whole territory (Fiji) or part of it (Bougainville). Less. 
in that in both cases there has been a significant continuity in personnel (Fiji •s 
governor general continued as president of the new republic and Bougainville •s 
provincial secretary reappeared as leader of the secessionist cabinet of the Republic 
of Mclcamui). More, in that the assumptioos and expectations under which these 
same individuals governed bad changed irreversibly. towuds terms set by military 
leaders in the background. Rabuka and Ona. 
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